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Gerrymandering goes back to the states

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<div class&equals;'mailmunch-forms-before-post' style&equals;'display&colon; none &excl;important&semi;'><&sol;div><div class&equals;"content-img-wrp">&NewLine;<div>The Supreme Court&&num;8217&semi;s decision left some wondering what next&quest;  The decisive 9-0 ruling meant no desention in the Courtroom only for those left with what some say is a non-ruling&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<div><&sol;div>&NewLine;<div>We&&num;8217&semi;ve included a great article in <a href&equals;"http&colon;&sol;&sol;thehill&period;com&sol;opinion&sol;judiciary&sol;393012-with-gerrymandering-supreme-court-hangs-on-justice-kennedys-words">The Hill by Carolyn Shapiro<&sol;a> which goes into the reason&&num;8217&semi;s behind the ruling and why some Justices ruled the way they did and the key role Kennedy played in this decision&period;<&sol;p><script async src&equals;"&sol;&sol;pagead2&period;googlesyndication&period;com&sol;pagead&sol;js&sol;adsbygoogle&period;js"><&sol;script> &NewLine;<ins class&equals;"adsbygoogle" &NewLine; style&equals;"display&colon;block&semi; text-align&colon;center&semi;" &NewLine; data-ad-layout&equals;"in-article" &NewLine; data-ad-format&equals;"fluid" &NewLine; data-ad-client&equals;"ca-pub-5175198302130341" &NewLine; data-ad-slot&equals;"9182933377"><&sol;ins> &NewLine;<script> &NewLine; &lpar;adsbygoogle &equals; window&period;adsbygoogle &vert;&vert; &lbrack;&rsqb;&rpar;&period;push&lpar;&lbrace;&rcub;&rpar;&semi; &NewLine;<&sol;script>&NewLine;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<div class&equals;"content-img-wrp">&NewLine;<div><&sol;div>&NewLine;<div>THE HILL<&sol;div>&NewLine;<div>Title&colon; With Gerrymandering&comma; Supreme Court hangs on Justice Kennedy&&num;8217&semi;s words&period;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<div>by&colon; Carolyn Shapiro<&sol;p>&NewLine;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<div><&sol;div>&NewLine;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<div class&equals;"content-with-sidebar-wrp">&NewLine;<div class&equals;"content-wrp">&NewLine;<div class&equals;"field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden">&NewLine;<div class&equals;"field-items">&NewLine;<div class&equals;"field-item even">&NewLine;<p>The Supreme Court’s 9-0 nondecision in <a href&equals;"https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;supremecourt&period;gov&sol;opinions&sol;17pdf&sol;16-1161&lowbar;dc8f&period;pdf" target&equals;"&lowbar;blank" rel&equals;"noopener noreferrer"><em>Gill v&period; Whitford<&sol;em><&sol;a> was more than a little anticlimactic&period; The Court had been asked to decide if extreme partisan gerrymandering can be challenged in federal court and if so&comma; what standard should apply&period; &lpar;Extreme partisan gerrymandering allows a party to maintain disproportionate control of a state’s legislature or congressional delegation even if the majority of the state’s voters cast their ballots for candidates of the other party&period;&rpar;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>The Court decided neither question&comma; ruling unanimously that the plaintiffs — Democrats in Wisconsin challenging the legislative map Republicans put in place after the 2010 census — lacked standing&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>The Court&comma; in an <a href&equals;"http&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;scotusblog&period;com&sol;case-files&sol;cases&sol;gill-v-whitford&sol;" target&equals;"&lowbar;blank" rel&equals;"noopener noreferrer">opinion by Chief Justice Roberts<&sol;a>&comma; made two basic points&period; First&comma; it characterized the plaintiffs’ claim as a complaint that the way the districts were drawn &OpenCurlyDoubleQuote;diluted” their votes&comma; making them less effective than the votes of other voters&comma; in violation of the Equal Protection Clause&period; Second&comma; it said that the plaintiffs failed to show that they had actually suffered that kind of injury&comma; and it remanded the case to allow them to attempt to do so&period; &lpar;Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would have simply ordered the case dismissed&period;&rpar;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>Despite the failure of the Court as a whole to reach the underlying questions&comma; however&comma; there are four justices who clearly think that extreme partisan gerrymandering can be challenged in&comma; and remedied by&comma; a court&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>Justice Kagan&comma; joined by Justices Ginsburg&comma; Breyer&comma; and Sotomayor&comma; wrote a concurrence in which she described the kind of evidence the plaintiffs could submit on remand to establish standing&period; She also fleshed out an entirely different theory from the dilution claim&comma; based on the First Amendment and potential plaintiffs’ ability to organize and freely associate&comma; and explained how these or other plaintiffs might establish standing for that claim too&period; The chief justice’s opinion explicitly declined to express a view on this theory&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>Justice Kennedy&comma; who did not join Kagan’s opinion&comma; suggested in the 2004 case of <a href&equals;"https&colon;&sol;&sol;supreme&period;justia&period;com&sol;cases&sol;federal&sol;us&sol;541&sol;267&sol;opinion&period;html" target&equals;"&lowbar;blank" rel&equals;"noopener noreferrer"><em>Vieth v&period; Jubilirer<&sol;em><&sol;a> that the First Amendment theory might support gerrymandering challenges like the one at issue in <em>Gill<&sol;em>&period; Not surprisingly&comma; Justice Kagan relied heavily on this opinion<em>&period;<&sol;em> After all&comma; quoting Justice Kennedy is what everyone — justices and advocates alike — does when they want to woo him&period; And Justice Kennedy’s ultimate view on whether and how gerrymandering can be challenged remains a mystery&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>The chief justice quoted Kennedy as well when rejecting the argument that the Court must take up extreme partisan gerrymandering because it is &OpenCurlyDoubleQuote;the only institution in the United States that can … solve this problem&period;” Quoting Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in <a href&equals;"https&colon;&sol;&sol;supreme&period;justia&period;com&sol;cases&sol;federal&sol;us&sol;524&sol;417&sol;case&period;html" target&equals;"&lowbar;blank" rel&equals;"noopener noreferrer"><em>Clinton v&period; City of New York<&sol;em><&sol;a>&comma; the chief justice wrote&colon; &OpenCurlyDoubleQuote;Failure of political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies&period;”<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>But this quote is taken completely out of context&period; In <em>Clinton<&sol;em>&comma; the Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act &lpar;LIVA&rpar;&period; The lack of political will Justice Kennedy was referring to involved the challenge of controlling government spending&comma; and the unconstitutional &OpenCurlyDoubleQuote;remedy” was LIVA itself&period; In explaining why he believed LIVA was unconstitutional&comma; Kennedy emphasized the role that the separation of powers plays in protecting individual rights&period; Specifically&comma; he argued&comma; LIVA &OpenCurlyDoubleQuote;establishes a new mechanism which gives the President the sole ability to hurt a group that is a visible target&comma; in order to disfavor the group or to extract further concessions from Congress&period;”<&sol;p><div class&equals;'mailmunch-forms-in-post-middle' style&equals;'display&colon; none &excl;important&semi;'><&sol;div>&NewLine;<p>In other words&comma; Kennedy said that this targeting ability was corrosive of the Constitution’s structure and protections&period; And it was important that the Court police those lines&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>Such concerns also support the <em>Gill <&sol;em>plaintiffs’ challenge to extreme partisan gerrymandering&period; Again&comma; the lawsuit involves a statute — the redistricting map&period; And although the constitutional claims in gerrymandering cases are different from those at issue in <em>Clinton<&sol;em>&comma; the concern about protecting groups from being inappropriately targeted is eerily similar&period; As with LIVA&comma; partisan gerrymandering politically disadvantages a disfavored group of people&comma; denying them the ordinary lines of political redress and influence&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>Furthermore&comma; the lack of political will has little to do with the problem of gerrymandering&period; Extreme partisan gerrymandering renders political will irrelevant&comma; or at least impotent&comma; replacing it instead with self-perpetuating&comma; entrenched power&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>In <em>Clinton<&sol;em>&comma; Kennedy insisted that Congress must make difficult political decisions instead of punting them to the president&period; But extreme gerrymandering reduces legislators’ incentive and ability to make such difficult political decisions — particularly bipartisan ones&period; In gerrymandered districts&comma; for example&comma; elected officials are often more worried about primary challenges than about winning in the general election and are thus more likely to take relatively extreme positions than to take centrist&comma; bipartisan ones&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>Some might ask how much all this really matters&period; When given the opportunity&comma; both Democrats and Republicans have engaged in partisan gerrymandering&period; But as redistricting technology continues to become more precise&comma; the party that controls the redistricting body — which in most states is the legislature — can keep itself in power by redrawing the maps in its favor after each census&period; Republicans now have the upper hand&comma; largely due to a <a href&equals;"https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;nytimes&period;com&sol;2010&sol;09&sol;08&sol;us&sol;politics&sol;08legislature&period;html" target&equals;"&lowbar;blank" rel&equals;"noopener noreferrer">strategy<&sol;a> of taking state houses in 2010 specifically so that they would control redistricting after the census that year&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>In states like Wisconsin&comma; <a href&equals;"https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;brennancenter&period;org&sol;analysis&sol;curious-case-north-carolinas-congressional-map" target&equals;"&lowbar;blank" rel&equals;"noopener noreferrer">North Carolina<&sol;a>&comma; and <a href&equals;"https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;usnews&period;com&sol;news&sol;virginia&sol;articles&sol;2017-02-13&sol;is-it-gerrymandering-or-democratic-clustering" target&equals;"&lowbar;blank" rel&equals;"noopener noreferrer">Virginia<&sol;a>&comma; Republican control of the redistricting process maintains a significant skew between the statewide vote and the partisan control of the legislature and&sol;or congressional delegation&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>That skew can have corrosive effects on our democratic institutions&period; A House of Representatives controlled by partisan delegations that do not enjoy majority support in their home states cannot serve the purpose the Framers envisioned&semi; it is likely to be much less responsive to the interests and preferences of the People than is a more representative body&period; And state legislatures also can impact our national institutions&period; <a href&equals;"http&colon;&sol;&sol;thehill&period;com&sol;opinion&sol;judiciary&sol;353283-gerrymandering-the-constitution-theres-more-than-just-statehouses-at-risk" target&equals;"&lowbar;blank" rel&equals;"noopener noreferrer">State legislatures could call for and ratify constitutional amendments<&sol;a> — or maybe even an entirely new constitution — that in no way reflect the overwhelming popular support such fundamental changes should enjoy&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p>Chief Justice Roberts was thus wrong to deem irrelevant the Court’s unique ability to protect our democracy&period; Extreme partisan gerrymandering turns democracy into a zero-sum game that undermines political compromise and accountability&period; Just as the Court in <i>Clinton preserved<&sol;i> not only the form but also the democratic purpose&comma; of the roles the Constitution assigns to Congress and the president&comma; so too should the Court protect the structures necessary for a functioning republican democracy&period; We’ll know whether it will within the next couple of years&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;<p><em>Carolyn Shapiro is an associate professor of law at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law&comma; the founder and co-director of Chicago-Kent&&num;8217&semi;s <&sol;em><a href&equals;"http&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;kentlaw&period;iit&period;edu&sol;institutes-centers&sol;institute-on-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states" target&equals;"&lowbar;blank" rel&equals;"noopener noreferrer"><em>Institute on the Supreme Court of the United States<&sol;em><&sol;a><em> &lpar;ISCOTUS&rpar; and director of the Public Interest Certificate Program&period; Shapiro is a former Illinois Solicitor General and is one of the 18 constitutional law professors on an <&sol;em><a href&equals;"http&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;scotusblog&period;com&sol;wp-content&sol;uploads&sol;2017&sol;09&sol;16-1161-bsac-constitutional-law-professors&period;pdf" target&equals;"&lowbar;blank" rel&equals;"noopener noreferrer"><em>amicus brief<&sol;em><&sol;a><em> in support of the respondent in Gill v&period; Whitford&period;<&sol;em><&sol;p>&NewLine;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<&sol;p><div class&equals;'mailmunch-forms-after-post' style&equals;'display&colon; none &excl;important&semi;'><&sol;div><&sol;p><p class&equals;"wpsai&lowbar;spacing&lowbar;before&lowbar;adsense"><&sol;p> &NewLine;

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